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I. INTRODUCTION
On January 11, 1983, at approximately 12:50 a.m., Nancy Cruzan
died.' She was "lifeless and not breathing" and had apparently died.2
At approximately 1:10 a.m. paramedics started cardiopulmonary resus-
citation and at 1:11 a.m. they commenced advanced life support pro-
cedures, including intubation and intravenous infusions. By 1:13 a.m.
Nancy had essentially been brought back to life; she exhibited a faint
heartbeat as well as spontaneous breathing.'
The trial court judge estimated that Nancy suffered from anoxia,
the deprivation of oxygen to the brain, for a period of 12 to 14 minutes.
4
Under ordinary circumstances, the maximum period for the brain to be
without oxygen without permanent brain damage resulting is generally
thought to be less than six minutes.'
Nancy remained in a coma for three weeks and then progressed to
an unconscious state, commonly referred to as a persistent vegetative
state. 6 A gastrostomy nutrition and hydration tube7 was implanted in
her stomach, but she never improved.' In 1988 Nancy's parents requested
that her doctors terminate artificial nutrition and hydration, but the
hospital refused to do so without a court order. After the Cruzans filed
a declaratory judgment action and a hearing was held, the trial court
ordered 9 the hospital to carry out the Cruzans' request. The trial court
based its decision on the existence of a "fundamental natural right" in
the Constitution to "refuse or direct the withholding or withdrawal of
artificial death prolonging procedures when the person has no more
cognitive brain function ... and there is no hope of further recovery."' 0
The court based the Cruzans' authority to act for Nancy on "[h]er
expressed thoughts at age twenty-five in somewhat serious conversation
1. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 430 (Mo. 1988) (en banc) (Higgins, J.,
dissenting). Apparently Nancy's car ran off the road and overturned several times. Nancy
was found 35 feet away from her car face down in a ditch.
2. Id. at 430.
3. Id. at 430-31.
4. Id. at 431.
5. Id.
6. See infra notes 30-38 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 19-29 and accompanying text.
8. Pursuant to this Supreme Court case, Jasper County Probate Judge Charles Teel
ruled, after new evidence was introduced, that there was clear and convincing evidence
of Nancy's intent to have life-sustaining treatment withdrawn and that the feeding tube
which had kept her alive since 1983 could be disconnected. The ruling was not appealed
and Nancy died on Dec. 26, 1990.
9. Estate of Cruzan, Estate No. CV384-9P (P. Div. Cir. Ct., Jasper County, Mo.,
July 27, 1988).
10. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 434 (Mo. 1988) (en banc) (Higgins, J.,
dissenting) (quoting the trial court).
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with a housemate friend that if sick or injured she would not wish to
continue her life unless she could live at least halfway normally.""
The state and the guardian ad litem (Nancy's court-appointed rep-
resentative) both appealed.' 2 The Supreme Court of Missouri, in a four-
three vote 3 reversed. Because Missouri promotes the preservation of life
as a strong state interest, the Missouri Supreme Court held that no one
is entitled to exercise another's right to refuse medical treatment "in
the absence of the formalities required under Missouri's Living Will
statutes or the clear and convincing, inherently reliable evidence absent
here."14
The United States Supreme Court granted the petition for writ of
certiorari 5 and affirmed, 6 holding that the Constitution did not forbid
Missouri from requiring clear and convincing evidence of Nancy's own
desires as to whether life-sustaining treatment should be terminated.
Four justices dissented, 7 evidencing the usual divergence of views sur-
rounding an intensely personal subject, such as the right to die.
As the Court itself said in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department
of Health, "in deciding 'a question of such magnitude and importance
... it is the [better] part of wisdom not to attempt, by any general
statement, to cover every possible phase of the subject."' " Therefore,
this note will only cover the major developments and implications in
the Cruzan opinion.
In order to understand the importance and relevance of Cruzan,
this note begins with a discussion of the effect of medical technological
advances and an explanation of the persistent vegetative state. This note
11. Id. at 433.
12. It is interesting to note that Nancy's court-appointed representative, the guardian
ad litem, found himself "believing that it is in Nancy's 'best interest to have the tube
feeding discontinued,' but 'feeling that an appeal should be made because our responsibility
to her as attorneys and guardians ad lilem was to pursue this matter to the highest court
in the state in view of the fact that this is a case of first impression in the State of
Missouri."' Id. at 410 n.l.
13. One of the judges in the majority was not a member of the court but only sitting
temporarily. Judge Welliver in his dissent argued that the case should have been decided
by appointed members of the court. "It is deeply regrettable to me that an issue of this
magnitude and importance to every citizen of the State is decided by the single vote of
any special judge while the sitting members of the regular Court are evenly divided on
this issue." Id. at 442 (Welliver, J., dissenting).
14. Id. at 425.
15. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 109 S. Ct. 3240 (1989).
16. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990).
17. Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices
White, O'Connor, Scalia and Kennedy joined. O'Connor and Scalia filed concurring
opinions. Justice Stevens filed a dissenting opinion, as did Justice Brennan, in which
Justices Marshall and Blackmun joined.
18. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2851 (quoting Twin City Bank v. Nebeker, 167 U.S. 196,
202, 17 S. Ct. 766, 769 (1897)),
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continues with the° Court's recognition of nutrition and hydration as
medical treatment. Next, this note will address the Court's consideration
of informed consent and the common law right to self-determination
and bodily integrity as a basis for the right to refuse life-sustaining
treatment. An analysis of the Court's evasiveness on a Constitutional
right to privacy in this area, and the Court's approval of Missouri's
evidentiary standard will follow. Additionally, this note will review the
state interests commonly referred to by the state courts as potentially
outweighing a person's right to refuse life-sustaining treatment. This
note will then explore, through a survey of state cases, the various tests
that courts have adopted in deciding whether a third party has the
authority to exercise an incompetent's right to refuse treatment. The
note concludes with a brief survey and explanation of the role living
wills play in an incompetent's right to refuse medical treatment.
II. IMPORTANCE AND RELEVANCE OF CRUZAN
A. Medical Technological Advances-The Ability to Sustain Life-But
at What Costs?
"No other country goes to nearly such lengths to preserve life.
Japanese surgeons perform no organ transplants. In Britain kid-
ney dialysis isn't generally available to anyone over fifty-five .... "'
Because we do not turn away from the greater technology, we
face the deeper dilemma.' 9
The advance of medical technology to a degree where doctors can
now keep patients-who otherwise would have died-alive on a variety
of machines and medications has led to a proliferation of cases on a
patient's right to die.20 These cases are usually brought by a relative or
guardian who recognizes that although the body's biological functions
are still operative, there is "no sense of pain or pleasure, fear or joy,
love or hate, understanding or appreciation, taste or touch or smell or
any other aspect of life's experience, with no realistic possibility of
sentient life." '21
A disturbing effect of technological advances in medicine is their
use on patients for whom they were not originally intended." Two
19. Robertson, Is "Substituted Judgment" a Valid Legal Concept?, 5 Issues in L.
& Med. 198 (1989) (quoting Smith, What Do We Owe to the Elderly?, Fortune, Mar.
27, 1989, at 54, 55).
20. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2847.
21. Gray by Gray v. Romeo, 697 F. Supp. 580, 584 (D.R.I. 1988).
22. Rhoden, Litigating Life and Death, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 375, 423 (1988).
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examples of this, cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) and artificial
nourishment, were used to keep Nancy Cruzan alive. CPR was initially
developed to aid healthy persons whose hearts stopped beating after
surgery, near drowning, or during other traumatic events-not to "pro-
long terminally ill patients' dying processes by reviving them time and
time again. '"23 Nancy Cruzan would not have existed for so long in a
persistent vegetative state if paramedics, knowing she had suffered anoxia
for over ten minutes, had not performed CPR on her and brought her
back to life. Additionally, artificial nourishment, or feeding by a na-
sogastric or gastrostomy tube, originally developed to assist curable
patients during periods of incapability, is now used to sustain the 5,000
to 10,000 patients in the United States in a persistent vegetative state.
2 4
A second consideration in the area of medical breakthroughs is that
of the quality of life experienced by the patient in a persistent vegetative
state kept alive by machinery. A description of Nancy Cruzan's medical
condition while she was in a persistent vegetative state is illustrative
here. Although her respiration and circulation were not artificially main-
tained, she was "oblivious to her environment except for reflexive res-
ponses to sound and perhaps painful stimuli.'' The ventricles of her
brain were enlarged and filled with cerebrospinal fluid, so that her
cerebral cortex had degenerated irreversibly and progressively. She was
a quadriplegic, and her four limbs were contracted so severely that her
fingernails cut into her wrists. She had no cognitive ability and was
basically lacking all consciousness.
2 6
Although some may nevertheless view existence in this condition as
"life," most would say it is a life not worth living. In a 1988 American
Medical Association poll, eighty percent of those questioned would choose
withdrawal of life support systems from hopelessly ill or irreversibly
comatose patients if they or their families requested it.27 In a 1988 poll
by the Colorado University Graduate School of Public Affairs, eighty-
five percent of those surveyed would not want their own lives maintained
by artificial nutrition and hydration should they become permanently
unconscious.2" Justice Handler of the New Jersey Supreme Court sum-
marized his feelings on the subject in In re Conroy:
23. Id.
24. Cranford & Smith, Consciousness: The Most Critical Moral (Constitutional) Stan-
dard for Human Personhood, 13 Am. J.L. & Med. 233, 238 (1987).
25. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2845 n.l (1990).
26. Id. See also, id. at 2869 n.10 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
27. Id. at 2869 n.11 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting New York Times, June 5,
1988, at 14, col. 4 (citing American Medical News, June 3, 1988 at 9, col. 1)).
28. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2869 n.11 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting from the
Coloradoan, Sept. 29, 1988, at 1).
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Eventually, pervasive bodily intrusions, even for the best motives,
will arouse feelings akin to humiliation and mortification for
the helpless patient. When cherished values of human dignity
and personal privacy, which belong to every person living or
dying, are sufficiently transgressed by what is being done to the
individual, we should be ready to say: enough. 29
B. What is the Persistent Vegetative State?
Although allowing someone to die by withdrawing life-sustaining
medical treatment seems cruel and horrific at first glance, a better
understanding of the true nature of the persistent vegetative state may
lead the reader to see the deeper motivation for such action. According
to Dr. Fred Plum, the creator of the term, a persistent vegetative state
is one in which the body's internal functions operate to maintain tem-
perature, heart beat, pulmonary ventilation, digestive activity and con-
ditional reflex activity.30 There is, however, no "behavioral evidence of
either self-awareness or awareness of the surroundings in a learned
manner.""1 The persistent vegetative state results from damage to the
higher areas of the brain, while the brain stem remains intact. Because
the brain stem is not damaged, the patient can breathe on his own and
even appears to be awake, but the patient is completely unaware and
unconscious. These patients can live for years or even decades with
artificial feeding and hydration.3 2
Once society fully grasps the medical reality of a persistently veg-
etative patient lacking consciousness, personality and even what some
consider a soul, certain value judgments are likely to follow. These may
include a "weak presumption toward medical treatment and preservation
of life, one which is easily overcome by relevant considerations for non-
treatment." 3 This value judgment translates into a lower evidentiary
requirement for one seeking to remove a loved one from life-sustaining
treatment. For example, society initially resisted the notion of brain
death as a legal basis for determining the death of a person;34 however,
29. In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 399, 486 A.2d 1209, 1250 (1985) (Handler, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
30. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2845 n.1 (quoting In re Jobes, 108 N.J. 394, 403, 529
A.2d 434, 438 (1987)).
31. Id.
32. Damage to the brain stem itself causes a coma, normally requiring that the
patients be put on a respirator. Cranford & Smith, supra note 24, at 238.
33. Cranford & Smith, supra note 24, at 243.
34. Louisiana's definition of death:
A person will be considered dead if in the announced opinion of a physician,
duly licensed in the state of Louisiana based on ordinary standards of approved
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once the medical profession expressed specific criteria to be met and
showed that brain death could be diagnosed with an extremely high
degree of certainty, the public more readily accepted it.31
Doctors are now able to diagnose the persistent vegetative state with
a very high degree of accuracy.36 The American Academy of Neurology
postulates three medical bases for the conclusion that these patients are
not able to experience any thoughts or feelings. First, "direct clinical
experience" with the patients reveals they have no awareness of pain
or suffering. Second, post-mortem examinations of persistently vegetative
patients show extreme damage to the cerebral hemispheres to a degree
"incompatible with consciousness" while the patients were alive. Third,
positron emission tomography indicates the metabolic rate for glucose
in the cerebral cortex is reduced in persistent vegetative patients to a
degree "incompatible with consciousness. ' 37
Medical evidence shows that patients in a persistent vegetative state
are permanently unconscious. They do not live; they only exist. As
Justice Blackmar of the Missouri Supreme Court aptly described it in
his dissent in Cruzan v. Harmon, those who believe in preserving this
existence "without regard to its quality . .. dwell in ivory towers. ' 38
III. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SUPREME COURT'S OPINION
A. Nutrition and Hydration as Medical Treatment
In Cruzan, the Supreme Court implied that the right to refuse
medical treatment included the right to refuse life-sustaining nutrition
medical practice, the person has experienced an irreversible cessation of spon-
taneous respiratory and circulatory functions. In the event that artificial means
of support preclude a determination that these functions have ceased, a person
will be considered dead if in the announced opinion of a physician, . . . the
person has experienced an irreversible total cessation of brain function. Death
will have occurred at the time when the relevant functions ceased....
La. R.S. 9:111 (1991).
35. Cranford & Smith, supra note 24, at 236.
36. "Out of the 100,000 patients who, like Nancy, have fallen into persistive vegetative
states in the past 20 years due to loss of oxygen to the brain, there have been only three
even partial recoveries documented in the medical literature.... The longest any person
has ever been in a persistent vegetative state and recovered was 22 months." (emphasis
added) (Nancy has been in this state for seven years.). Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept.
of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2868 n.8 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (referring to Brief
for American Medical Association et al. as Amici Curiae, 11-12, and Snyder, Cranford,
Rubens, Bundlie, & Rockswold, Delayed Recovery from Postanoxic Persistent Vegetative
State, 14 Annals Neurol. 156 (1983)).
37. Cranford & Smith, supra note 24, at 239-40.
38. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 429 (Mo. 1988) (en banc) (Blackmar, J.,
dissenting).
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and hydration when the Court "assume[d]," "for purposes of this case,"
"that the United States Constitution would grant a competent person
a constitutionally protected right to refuse lifesaving hydration and nu-
trition. ' 39 The recognition of nutrition and hydration as medical treat-
ment by the Court does not seem very persuasive at first glance because
of the ambivalent language used. The Court, however, could have used
the nutrition and hydration issue to avoid deciding at all the real issues
-whether there exists a constitutional right to die and whether Missouri
could require clear and convincing evidence. That the Court did not
take the easier route of focusing on the nutrition/hydration issue to
resolve the case reveals that the justices of the majority believe, if not
forcefully, that the administration of life-sustaining nutrition and hy-
dration is medical treatment. Additionally, Justice O'Connor, in her
concurring opinion, clearly states that proposition: "Artificial feeding
cannot readily be distinguished from other forms of medical treatment.'"°
Justice Brennan echoes this sentiment in his dissent, in which Justices
Marshall and Blackmuh joined: "No material distinction can be drawn
between the treatment to which Nancy Cruzan continues to be subject-
artificial nutrition and hydration-and any other medical treatment."'4
Although the withholding of food and water evokes a strong emo-
tional response from a society which views the two as the "necessities
of life," they do constitute medical treatment when delivered artificially.
A gastrostomy tube, as was used to feed and hydrate Nancy Cruzan,
is surgically implanted into the stomach through an incision in the
abdominal wall.42 A significant risk of adverse complications exists, just
as with any serious medical treatment procedure.4 3
Most leading medical organizations" and the lower courts45 consider
artificially provided nutrition and hydration to be medical treatment.
39. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2852 (1990).
40. Id. at 2857 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
41. Id. at 2866 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
42. Id. at 2857 (O'Connor, J., concurring), and at 2866 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
43. Possible complications include the tube's obstruction of the intestinal tract, erosion
and piercing of the stomach wall, or leakage of the stomach's contents into the abdominal
cavity. Additionally, pneumonia may result from seepage of the stomach's contents into
the lungs. Id. at 2866 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
44. Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs of the American Medical Association,
Current Opinions sec. 2.20 (1989) ( "[Ilit is not unethical to discontinue all means of life-
prolonging medical treatment," including nutrition and hydration where patient is in
irreversible coma); Position of the American Academy of Neurology on Certain Aspects
of the Care and Management of the Persistent Vegetative State Patient, 39 Neurology
125, 125 (1989) ("The artificial provision of nutrition and hydration is analogous to other
forms of life-sustaining treatment, such as the use of the respirator."); President's Com-
mission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral
Research, Deciding to Forego Life-Sustaining Treatment: A Report on the Ethical, Medical,
1314 [Vol. 51
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However, a vociferous group of dissenters still remains." Additionally,
at least twenty-two states specifically exclude nutrition and hydration
from medical treatment that a patient could refuse in a living will.4 7 In
its next case on the subject, the Supreme Court should clearly state
whether the administration of nutrition and hydration is medical treat-
ment. Based on the fact that four Justices specifically held and five
Justices implied that food and water constitute medical treatment, as
well as the indication that most, if not all lower courts feel the same,
the Court will probably clearly hold that the administration of food
and water is medical treatment.
Those who object to the withdrawal of nutrition and hydration from
a person in a persistent vegetative state concentrate on the type of death
that will occur, for it essentially involves starving a person to death. 4
and Legal Issues in Treatment Decisions 90 (1983) ("[N]o particular treatments-including
such 'ordinary' hospital interventions as parenteral nutrition or hydration," were found
to be "obligatory" for a patient to accept.); see also Hastings Center, Guidelines on the
Termination of Life-Sustaining Treatment and the Care of the Dying 59 (1987).
45. See, e.g., Bouvia v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297
(Cal. App. 2d Dist. 1986); Barber v. Superior Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 1016, 195
Cal. Rptr. 484, 490 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 1983); Corbett v. D'Allessandro, 487 So. 2d
368, 371 (Fla. App. 2d Dist. 1986); Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., Inc., 398 Mass.
417, 497 N.E.2d 626 (1986); In re Gardner, 534 A.2d 947, 954-55 (Me. 1987); In re
Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 373, 486 A.2d 1209, 1235-37 (1985); In re Grant, 109 Wash. 2d
545, 559-65, 747 P.2d 445, 452-55 (1987).
46. Harris & Bostrom, Is the Continued Provision of Food and Fluids in Nancy
Cruzan's Best Interests?, 5 Issues in L. & Med. 415 (1990); May, Barry, Griese, Grisez,
Johnstone, Marzen, McHugh, Meilaender, Siegler & Smith, Feeding and Hydrating the
Permanently Unconscious and Other Vulnerable Persons, 3 Issues in L. & Med. 203
(1987); Office of the Vicar General, Archdiocese of New York, Principles in Regard to
Withholding or Withdrawing Artificially Assisted Nutrition/Hydration, 6 Issues in L. &
Med. 89 (1990).
47. See, e.g., Missouri's living will statute: "Death-prolonging procedure shall not
include ... the performance of any procedure to provide nutrition or hydration;" Mo.
Rev. Stat. § 459.010(3) (Supp. 1991).
48. See Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., Inc., 398 Mass. 417, 444 n.2, 497
N.E.2d 626, 641 n.2 (1986) (Lynch, J., dissenting). Justice Lynch observed:
Removal of the G tube would likely create various effects from the lack of
hydration and nutrition, leading ultimately to death. Brophy's mouth would dry
out and become caked or coated with thick material. His lips would become
parched and cracked. His tongue would swell, and might crack. His eyes would
recede back into their orbits and his cheeks would become hollow. The lining
of his nose might crack and cause his nose to bleed. His skin would hang loose
on his body and become dry and scaly. His urine would become highly con-
centrated, leading to burning of the bladder. The lining of his stomach would
dry out and he would experience dry heaves and vomiting. His body temperature
would become very high. His biain cells would dry out, causing convulsions.
His respiratory tract would dry out, and the thick secretions that would result
could plug his lungs and cause death. At some point within five days to three
weeks his major'organs, including his lungs, heart, and brain, would give out
and he would die.
1991] 1315
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
They must remember, however, that persons in this condition, according
to medical authority, 49 feel absolutely nothing.
B. Basis for a Right to Refuse Treatment: Informed Consent and a
"Liberty Interest"
In order to find a basis for the right to refuse life-saving medical
treatment, the Court looked to three areas: (1) the common law doctrine
of informed consent, (2) the federal right to privacy, and (3) a consti-
tutionally protected "liberty interest."
First, the United States Supreme Court in Cruzan recognized that
the common law doctrine of informed consent forms a basis for the
right to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment. 50 The notion of bodily
integrity was originally enunciated by the Court in Union Pacific Railway
Co. v. Botsford:51 "No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully
guarded, by the common law, than the right of every individual to the
possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or
interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of
law.'' 52
This idea later developed into the requirement that informed consent
must be obtained from a patient before medical treatment could be
performed,53 and the "logical corollary" of this doctrine, as the Court
noted in Cruzan, is the right to refuse treatment . 4
In addition to discussing the common law right of informed consent,
the Court also considered a federal constitutional right as a basis for
the right to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment. The constitutional
right in this area commonly referred to by state courts is the right to
privacy. Although the United States Constitution does not explicitly
enunciate such a right, the Court in Griswold v. Connecticut" found
such a right emanating from "penumbras" in the Bill of Rights that
49. See supra text accompanying notes 30-38.
50. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2851 (1990)
("[T]he common-law doctrine of informed consent is viewed as generally encompassing
the right of a competent individual to refuse medical treatment.").
51. 141 U.S. 250, 11 S. Ct. 1000 (1891).
52. Id. at 251, 11 S. Ct. at 1001.
53. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2846-47 (referring to Schloendorff v. Society of New York
Hospital, 211 N.Y. 125, 129-130, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914); Justice Cardozo said: "Every
human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done
with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation without his patient's consent
commits an assault, for which he is liable in damages.").
54. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2847. See also In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 347, 486 A.2d
1209, 1222 (1985) ("The patient's ability to control his bodily integrity through informed
consent is significant only when one recognizes that this right also encompasses a right
to informed refusal.").
55. 381 U.S. 479, 85 S. Ct. 1678 (1965).
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create "zones of privacy." 5 6 The Court has extended this right to privacy
to include contraception,57 marriage,58 procreation,59 child rearing, 6° and
abortion. 61 The right to privacy is not absolute, however, 62 and only
those fundamental rights which are 'deeply rooted in this nation's
history and tradition, ' ' 63 or "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty""6
are included. 65
Although many of the lower courts have based their decisions up-
holding a right to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment on a federal
constitutional right to privacy, 66 the Court in Cruzan refused to char-
acterize this constitutional right as one based on privacy and instead
labeled it a "liberty interest."1
6 7
56. Id. at 484, 85 S. Ct. at 1681.
57. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 92 S. Ct. 1029 (1972).
58. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 98 S. Ct. 673 (1978); Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1, 87 S. Ct. 1817 (1967).
59. Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 62 S. Ct. 1110 (1942).
60. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 43 S. Ct. 625 (1923).
61. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S. Ct. 705 (1973).
62. Id. at 154, 93 S. Ct. at 727.
63. Bowers v. Hardwick, 487 U.S. 186, 192, 106 S. Ct. 2841, 2844 (1986) (quoting
Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503, 97 S. Ct. 1932, 1938 (1977)).
64. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325, 58 S. Ct. 149, 152 (1937).
65. Justice Scalia in his concurrence in Cruzan felt the right to refuse life-sustaining
medical treatment was not one that was "fundamental" because it amounted to suicide,
and that the Court should not involve itself in this field.
I would have preferred that we announce, clearly and promptly, that the federal
courts have no business in this field; that American law has always accorded
the State the power to prevent, by force if necessary, suicide-including suicide
by refusing to take appropriate measures necessary to preserve one's life; that
the point at which life becomes "worthless," and the point at which the means
necessary to preserve it become "extraordinary" or "inappropriate," are neither
set forth in the Constitution nor known to the nine Justices of this Court any
better than they are known to nine people picked at random from the Kansas
City telephone directory; and hence, that even when it is demonstrated by clear
and convincing evidence that a patient no longer wishes certain measures to be
taken to preserve her life, it is up to the citizens of Missouri to decide, through
their elected representatives, whether that wish will be honored. -
Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2859 (1990) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
66. See, e.g., Rasmussen by Mitchell v. Fleming, 154 Ariz. 207, 741 P.2d 674 (1987);
Bouvia v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (Cal. App. 2d
Dist. 1986); Foody v. Manchester Memorial Hosp., 40 Conn. Supp. 127, 482 A.2d 713
(1984); Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., Inc., 398 Mass. 417, 497 N.E.2d 626 (1986);
Superintendent of Belchertown v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977); In
re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976).
67. The Court stated: "Although many state courts have held that a right to refuse
treatment is encompassed by a generalized constitutional right of privacy, we have never
so held. We believe this issue is more properly analyzed in terms of a Fourteenth
Amendment liberty interest." Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2851 n.7.
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Why did the Supreme Court completely fail to consider a right to
privacy in this area? One possible reason is that the rights traditionally
protected by the right to privacy are "family-oriented," and the Court
did not want to extend the right of privacy beyond that realm. This
argument fails, however, under even the lightest of scrutiny for if the
right to choose whether to bring a child into this world is included in
the right to privacy, a fortiori so should be the right to refuse life-
sustaining treatment for yourself. A second explanation may be that the
Court felt uncomfortable in giving the right to die the substantive
protection of the right to privacy because the exercise of this right leads
to death, whereas the typical exercise of the right to privacy does not
have such extreme consequences. The final and most probable possibility
is that the conservative Court wanted to tighten the reins on the growing
right to privacy. As Ross Nankivell noted in This Far and No Further,
before the Court handed down its decision:
[I]n recent years the Court's conservative majority has shown
a growing restiveness with the expansive privacy rulings of the
Warren and Burger years, and it may be that Cruzan offers a
chance to trim the privacy right without having to use abortion-
always a volatile issue-to do so.68
1. Liberty Interest
In Cruzan, the Court avoided the right to privacy and instead labeled
the right to refuse life-sustaining treatment as a liberty interest. Although
the liberty interest and the right to privacy are both rooted in the due
process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments, each is the
result of a different interpretation of the clauses as explained by the
Supreme Court in Bowers v. Hardwick.69 A literal reading of the clauses
focuses on "the processes by which life, liberty, or property is taken''1 -
commonly known as procedural due process. Thus, any right classified
as a liberty interest can be infringed upon by the state or federal
governments if certain processes or preconditions are met. 7" Of course,
68. Nankivell, This Far and No Further: Is There a Constitutional Right to Die?,
A.B.A. J., April 1990, at 67.
69. 478 U.S. 186, 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986).
70. Id. at 191, 106 S. Ct. at 2844.
71. For examples of cases involving liberty interests, see, e.g., Jacobson v. Massa-
chusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25 S. Ct. 358 (1905); Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 77 S.
Ct. 408 (1957); Bowers, 478 U.S. 186, 106 S. Ct. 2841; Washington v. Harper, 110 S.
Ct. 1028 (1990).
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relevant state interests will determine the amount or type of process
required for a liberty interest to be infringed.7 2
The right to privacy, on the other hand, has developed from a line
of cases 7" which interpreted the due process clauses to have substantive
content, creating "rights that to a great extent are immune from federal
or state regulation or proscription." The privacy rights as the Bowers
Court explained, thus "have little or no textual support in the consti-
tutional language" yet receive "heightened judicial protection. 7 4 In
Bowers, the Court explained its reasons for scrutinizing the rights which
are proposed as falling under the right to privacy.
Striving to assure itself and the public that announcing rights
not readily identifiable in the Constitution's text involves much
more than the imposition of the Justices' own choice of values
on the States and the Federal Government, the Court has sought
to identify the nature of the rights qualifying for heightened
judicial protection.7
The Court's classification of the right to refuse life-sustaining medical
treatment as a liberty interest is certainly reasonable considering the
magnitude of what is at stake-life itself. The state can infringe on the
"right-to-die," as a liberty interest, as long as the individual is guaranteed
certain processes. The extent of state infringement will depend on a
balancing test between the relevant state interests and the right to refuse
life-sustaining medical treatment.7 6 Problems with such a classification
will arise, however, where the process guaranteed the individual is an
72. Breithaupt, 352 U.S. at 439, 77 U.S. at 412. The Breithaupt Court stated: "As
against the right of an individual that his person be held inviolable, ... must be set the
interests of society .. " The Court balanced society's interest in determining intoxication
to help prevent drunk driving accidents against Breithaupt's right of bodily integrity to
be free from an unwanted blood test.
73. See supra text accompanying notes 55-65.
74. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 191, 106 S. Ct. at 2844.
75. Id., 106 S. Ct. at 2844. The Court also stated in Bowers: "The Court is most
vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy when it deals with judge-made constitutional
law having little or no cognizable roots in the language or design of the Constitution."
Id. at 194, 106 S. Ct. at 2846.
76. One possible hypothetical based on the Court's classification of the right to refuse
life-sustaining medical treatment as a liberty interest subject only to procedural and not
substantive protection would involve the case of a super-intelligent rocket scientist who
is the "brain" behind the United States defense program. If he had a terminal disease
and wanted to die, but was able to be kept alive and productive through a series of
painful medical treatments, could the United States do so merely by conducting a hearing
and showing that the national interests in security outweigh his liberty interest in refusing
medical treatment? If the right to die is only a procedurally protected liberty interest
which can be infringed on if certain "processes" are met, one would think this could
occur.
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unfair one. An example of this may be Missouri's requirement that a
surrogate meet an extremely strict burden of proof before he can exercise
an incompetent's right to refuse treatment.
C. Right to Die for Incompetent Patients-Court Approves a State-
Imposed Evidentiary Requirement
After finding that a person has a constitutionally protected liberty
interest in refusing life-sustaining medical treatment, the Court then
considered the constitutionality of the "test" Missouri applies when a
surrogate is seeking to exercise an incompetent's right to die. The Su-
preme Court held that Missouri's requirement of clear and convincing
evidence of the incompetent's wishes as to the withdrawal of life-saving
treatment did not violate an incompetent's constitutional rights. 77
After "assuming," "for purposes of this case," 7 8 that the United
States Constitution would grant a competent person a constitutionally
protected right in refusing life-sustaining nutrition and hydration, the
Cruzan Court noted that an incompetent person could not exercise this
right himself because such a person, "is not able to make an informed
and voluntary choice to exercise a hypothetical right to refuse treat-
ment. . . . 79 Therefore, a surrogate must exercise the right for the
incompetent patient.
Under an essentially procedural due process analysis, the Court
balanced Missouri's requirement of clear and convincing evidence of the
incompetent's wishes along with various state interests against the right
of an incompetent patient to have a surrogate exercise his "right to
die." Based on Missouri's interest in the protection and preservation of
human life, the Court held: first, that Missouri could safeguard the
"deeply personal decision" ° of refusing life-saving treatment through a
heightened evidentiary standard; second, that Missouri was entitled to
guard against potential abuse in situations where family members may
not be acting in the best interest of the patient; third, that Missouri
could require a heavier evidentiary standard where it considered a judicial
proceeding not to be a truly adversarial one; and fourth, that Missouri
could decline to consider the "quality" of life which the incompetent
person enjoys and instead "assert an unqualified interest in the pres-
ervation of human life."
8
'
Because a standard of proof serves to "instruct the factfinder con-
cerning the degree of confidence our society thinks he should have in
77. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2852-54 (1990).
78. Id. at 2852.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 2853.
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the correctness of factual conclusions for a particular type of
adjudication ' 8 2 and also acts as "a societal judgment about how the
risk of error should be distributed between the litigants," 3 the Court
held Missouri could require clear and convincing evidence in a "right
to die" situation involving an incompetent.
1. The Evidentiary Standard Applied to Nancy Cruzan
When a person tells family or close friends that she does not
want her life sustained artificially, she is "expressfing] her wishes
in the only terms familiar to her, and ... as clearly as a lay
person should be asked to express them. To require more is
unrealistic, and for all practical purposes, it precludes the rights
of patients to forego life-sustaining treatment.85
82. Id. (quoting Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423, 99 S. Ct. 1804, 1808 (1979)
(quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 1076 (1970) (Harlan, J.,
concurring))).
83. Id. at 2854 (quoting Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 755, 102 S. Ct. 1388,
1395 (1982)). The Court in Cruzan found that Missouri could place the risk of an erroneous
decision on the surrogate seeking to terminate an incompetent's life-sustaining treatment.
We believe that Missouri may permissibly place an increased risk of an erroneous
decision on those seeking to terminate an incompetent individual's life-sustaining
treatment. An erroneous decision not to terminate results in a maintenance of
the status quo; the possibility of subsequent developments such as advancements
in medical science, the discovery of new evidence regarding the patient's intent,
changes in the law, or simply the unexpected death of the patient despite the
administration of life-sustaining treatment, at least create the potential that a
wrong decision will eventually be corrected or its impact mitigated. An erroneous
decision to withdraw life-sustaining treatment, however, is not susceptible of
correction.
Id. at 2854.
84. The Supreme Court has required clear and convincing evidence in deportation
proceedings, Woodby v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 385 U.S. 276, 87 S. Ct.
483 (1966), in denaturalization cases, Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 63
S. Ct. 1333 (1943), in civil commitment proceedings, Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418,
99 S. Ct. 1804 (1979), and in proceedings for the termination of parental rights, Santosky
v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 102 S. Ct. 1388 (1982). Although the requirement of clear and
convincing evidence in these cases and in Cruzan operates to recognize the seriousness of
the individual interests at stake, it is used in the above cases as a defense to protect an
individual right, i.e., the government must produce clear and convincing evidence to
deport, denaturalize, commit and to terminate parental rights. In Cruzan, Missouri's
evidentiary requirement acts as a bar in preventing the assertion of Nancy's rights. The
Supreme Court notes that in Cruzan it is seeking to protect the interests of an individual
rather than to take action against a person, but says this is "of no moment." Cruzan
v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2853-54 n.10 (1990).
85. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2875 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting In re O'Connor,
72 N.Y.2d 517, 551, 531 N.E.2d 607, 626, 534 N.Y.S.2d 886, 905 (1988) (Simons, J.,
dissenting)).
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Once the Court approved of Missouri's requirement of clear and
convincing evidence, it then considered whether the Missouri Supreme
Court had correctly assessed the insufficiency of the evidence. The Court
defined the standard of clear and convincing evidence in the area of
an incompetent's "right to die" as "proof sufficient to persuade the
trier of fact that the patient held a firm and settled commitment to the
termination of life supports under the circumstances like those pre-
sented, '"86 and as evidence which "produces in the mind of the trier of
fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought
to be established, evidence so clear, direct and weighty and convincing
as to enable [the factfinder] to come to a clear conviction, without
hesitancy, of the truth of the precise facts in issue." '87
The United States Supreme Court in Cruzan held that the Supreme
Court of Missouri did not commit constitutional error when it reversed
the lower court's ruling and found insufficient evidence of Nancy's
intent.8 8 Both the Missouri and United States Supreme Courts, however,
failed to properly consider all of the evidence. In finding that clear and
convincing evidence was lacking, the Missouri Supreme Court referred
only to a conversation between Nancy and her roommate, "best sum-
marized in the testimony of Nancy's roommate that she 'would not
want to continue her present existence without hope as it is.','89 Justice
Brennan in his dissent described the totality of the evidence which the
trial court considered but the two Supreme Courts ignored.9 This in-
cluded not only Nancy's conversation with her roommate, but also two
conversations with her sister, testimony by Nancy's mother and sister,
based on past conversations, that they were certain Nancy would want
to discontinue the treatment, and the recommendations of the guardian
ad /item-appointed by the trial court to protect Nancy's interests-that
there was clear and convincing evidence that Nancy would want to
discontinue the nutrition and hydration.9'
86. Id. at 2855 n.11 (quoting In re O'Connor, 72 N.Y.2d 517, 531, 531 N.E.2d 607,
613, 534 N.Y.S.2d 886, 892 (1988)).
87. Id. at 2855 n.II (quoting In re Jobes, 108 N.J. 394, 407-08, 529 A.2d 434, 441
(1987)).
88. The testimony adduced at trial consisted primarily of Nancy Cruzan's statements
made to a housemate about a year before her accident that she would not want to live
should she face life as a "vegetable," and other observations to the same effect. The
observations did not deal in terms of withdrawal of medical treatment or of hydration
and nutrition. Id. at 2855.
89. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 424 (Mo. 1988) (en banc).
90. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2874 nn.19-20
(1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
91. Id. Brennan looked to the trial record to find other evidence. Nancy's roommate,
Athena Comer, described a half-hour conversation which took place approximately one
year before Nancy's accident as "very serious." Athena testified that: ."Nancy said she
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Missouri's interpretation of the standard of clear and convincing
evidence seems to require if not a living will,9 then at the very least,
specific statements repeatedly made by the incompetent patient prior to
incompetency concerning particular types of treatment. This requirement
seems too demanding for a person who is not familiar with the various
life-sustaining treatments available. More importantly, people generally
are hesitant to discuss death and rarely anticipate an accident or medical
condition leading to a persistent vegetative state. A standard requiring
detailed conversations about death and references to certain life-sus-
taining treatments from people who hope to live long, full lives and
who do not anticipate becoming permanently unconscious deprives those
incompetent people of their right to refuse life-sustaining treatment. 93
As Justice Stevens described it in his dissent: "Because Nancy Beth
Cruzan did not have the foresight to preserve her constitutional right
in a living will, or some comparable 'clear and convincing' alternative,
her right is gone forever. . . ."94
As the Court itself noted, Missouri's requirement of clear and con-
vincing evidence of an incompetent's wishes "may have frustrated the
would never want to live [as a vegetative state] because if she couldn't be normal or
even, you know, like halfway, and do things for yourself, because Nancy always did,
that she didn't want to live ... and we talked about it a lot.' Tr. 388-389 .... [S]he
said that she hoped that [all the] people in her family knew that she wouldn't want to
live [as a vegetable] because she knew it was usually up to the family whether you lived
that way or not.' Id. at 399." Nancy's sister Christy also testified that she and Nancy
had had two very serious discussions about a year and a half before the accident. Christy
testified that Nancy had said, in response to the news of a stillborn niece, that "maybe
it was part of a 'greater plan' that the baby had been stillborn and did not have to face
'the possible life of mere existence.' Tr. 537." After her grandmother had died, Nancy
told Christy that 'it was better for my grandmother not to be kind of brought back
and forth (by] medical [treatment], brought back from a critical near point of death .....
Id., at 541."
Brennan pointed out other evidence the courts failed to consider including testimony
by Christy and Nancy's mother that Nancy would want to discontinue the treatment.
Christy said 'Nancy would be horrified at the state she is in.' Id., at 535." She would
also 'want to take that burden away from [her family].' Id., at 544." Christy added:
"Based on 'a lifetime of experience [I know Nancy's wishes] are to discontinue the
hydration and the nutrition.' Id., at 542." Nancy's mother testified: "'Nancy would not
want to be like she is now. [I]f it were me up there or Christy or any of us, she would
be doing for us what we are trying to do for her. I know she would, ... as her mother.'
Id., at 526."
92. See text accompanying infra notes 160-77 on living wills.
93. Gorby, Admissibility and Weighing Evidence of Intent in Right to Die Cases, 6
Issues in L. & Med. 33, 33-34 (1990). Gorby also notes that right to die cases should
be resolved "according to applicable constitutional and legal values of society and not
according to peripheral or collateral matters such as rules of evidence ... ." Using rules
of evidence to decide such cases "may even give courts a reprieve, of sorts, on dealing
with great substantive legal issues ... ." Id. at 34 n.3.
94. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2883 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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effectuation of the not-fully-expressed desires of Nancy Cruzan."9 How-
ever, the Court went on, "the Constitution does not require general
rules to work faultlessly; no general rule can.'' 96
The problem may lie with a state's adoption of, as the Court put
it, a "general rule." Instead of choosing one rigid policy which applies
in all situations, a state should have different approaches for the various
types of right to die cases which may arise. For example, where clear
and convincing evidence does exist, this should certainly be sufficient
for a surrogate to be able to exercise an incompetent's right to refuse
treatment. Where such evidence is lacking, the right, however, should
not be foreclosed. An alternative procedure to be discussed later would
involve allowing the family to make its best judgment as to what the
patient would have chosen. With regard to this alternative procedure,
the court would inquire as to whether the family truly has the patient
in mind, rather than some possible monetary benefit to be gained by
the patient's death.
IV. BALANCE OF STATE INTERESTS
We think that the State's interest ... weakens and the indi-
vidual's right to privacy grows as the degree of bodily invasion
increases and the prognosis dims.97
In Cruzan, the Supreme Court found that a state could infringe
upon an individual's liberty interest to refuse lifesaving medical treatment
as long as certain procedural due process requirements were met. The
extent of the procedure required is determined by a balancing test
between state interests in the matter and the applicable liberty interest
sought to be infringed. The Court found Missouri's strong interest in
the preservation of life, without reference to its quality, justified a clear
and convincing evidentiary standard that may impinge on an incompetent
person's right to refuse life-sustaining treatment. The lower courts have
generally referred to the following four summarized state interests which
are balanced against the right to die: preservation of life, prevention of
suicide, prevention of harm to third parties, and preservation of the
ethical integrity of the medical profession. 9
A. Preservation of Life
The state interest in the preservation of life is commonly considered
the most important of the four state interests. In fact, the Missouri
95. Id. at 2854.
96. Id.
97. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 41, 355 A.2d 647, 664 (1976).
98. See, e.g., In re Spring, 380 Mass. 629, 405 N.E.2d 115 (1980); Superintendent
of Belchertown v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 741, 370 N.E.2d 417, 425 (1977); In re
Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 348-49, 486 A.2d 1209, 1223 (1985).
1324 [Vol. 51
NOTES
Supreme Court concluded, after identifying the remaining three state
interests that, "In this case, only the state's interest in the preservation
of life is implicated." s
Supporters of this state interest explain that it embraces not only
a concern in preserving the life of the particular patient, but also an
interest in preserving the sanctity of all life. °° Although the preservation
of life in all instances seems a noble, worthy notion, it disregards the
quality of life sought to be preserved, for patients in a persistent veg-
etative state do not live in the true sense of the word. They are not
conscious, they do not think, and they do not feel. They merely exist.
Thus, one could argue that the "sanctity of life" is more offended not
where there is a decision to terminate life-sustaining treatment but instead
where there is a failure to respect the "individual free choice and self
determination"'' °0 of a patient like Nancy Cruzan who, according to the
Missouri Supreme Court, failed to express her wishes with particularity.
Additionally, it is easy to distinguish between a state's interest in a
patient's life where his affliction is curable as opposed to a state interest
in the life of an incurable patient "where, as here, the issue is not
whether but when, for how long, and at what cost to the individual
that life may be briefly extended."'°
B. Prevention of Suicide
A state also has an interest in preventing suicide. An interest in the
prevention of "irrational self-destruction,"'' 13 however, does not neces-
sarily apply in this area where a surrogate is exercising a permanently
unconscious patient's right to refuse medical treatment. Courts have
consistently held that refusing life-sustaining medical treatment does not
constitute suicide.'04 "Refusing medical intervention merely allows the
disease to take its natural course; if death were eventually to occur, it
would be the result, primarily, of the underlying disease, and not the
result of a self-inflicted injury."'0 5 Moreover, a specific intent to die is
99. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 419 (Mo. 1988) (en banc).
100. Conroy, 98 N.J. at 349, 486 A.2d at 1223.
101. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 742, 370 N.E.2d at 426.
102. Id. at 742, 370 N.E.2d at 425-26. See also Cranford & Smith, supra note 24,
at 243. "The state's interest in preserving life is less compelling when a patient retains
only the vegetative functions of basic biologic existence and is irreversibly incapable of
experiencing anything."
103. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 743 n.11, 370 N.E.2d at 426 n.11.
104. See, e.g., Foody v. Manchester Memorial Hosp., 40 Conn. Supp. 127, 137, 482
A.2d 713, 720 (1984); Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 743 n.11, 370 N.E.2d at 426 n.11; In re
Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 350, 486 A.2d 1209, 1224 (1985); In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d. 114,
123, 660 P.2d 738, 743 (1983).
105. In re Conroy, 98 N.J. at 351, 486 A.2d at 1224.
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lacking not only because an irreversibly unconscious patient would un-
doubtedly want to live if he could be restored to his previous condition
but also because a persistently vegetative patient is incapable of thought.'
The contents of various state living will statutes provide more support
for the idea that withholding medical treatment is not suicide. The
majority of living will statutes declare that the withholding or withdrawal
of life-sustaining treatment pursuant to the requirements of the statute
does not constitute suicide. °7 It would thus be fallacious to reason that
a state has an interest in preventing suicide only where a patient has
failed to complete "certain paperwork""'' i pursuant to a living will
statute.
C. Prevention of Harm to Third Parties
A third interest that a state may assert is in assuring that a patient's
or surrogate's decision to forego medical treatment will not adversely
affect third parties, usually children. Thus, courts have: recognized the
enforceability of a compulsory smallpox vaccination law,' °9 ordered a
mother of a seven-month-old infant to submit to blood transfusions
over her religious objections because of her responsibility to care for
her child," 0 and compelled a young unmarried pregnant woman to submit
to blood transfusions that would save her life."'
When applied to a situation involving a persistent vegetative patient
and removal of life-sustaining treatment," 2 it is immediately apparent
106. Id., 486 A.2d at 1224.
107. See, e.g., Louisiana's living will statute:
B. (1) The withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining procedures from a
qualified patient in accordance with the provisions of this Part shall not, for
any purpose, constitute a suicide.
La. R.S. 40:1299.58.10 B. (1) (Supp. 1991).
108. Rasmussen by Mitchell v. Fleming, 154 Ariz. 207, 218, 741 P.2d 674, 685 (Ariz.
1987) (en banc).
109. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25 S. Ct. 358 (1905).
110. Application of President & Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1000
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978, 84 S. Ct. 1883 (1964).
111. John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v. Heston, 58 N.J. 576, 279 A.2d 670 (1971).
112. Justice Brennan argued against an interest in the protection of third parties because
it could be taken too far.
If Missouri were correct that its interests outweigh Nancy's interest in avoiding
medical procedures as long as she is free of pain and physical discomfort ...
it is not apparent why a State could not choose to remove one of her kidneys
without consent on the ground that society would be better off if the recipient
of that kidney were saved from renal poisoning .... Patches of her skin could
also be removed to provide grafts for burn victims, and scrapings of bone
marrow to provide grafts for someone with leukemia .... Indeed, why could
the State not perform medical experiments on her body, experiments that might
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that this state interest is minimal at best. A parent who is unable to
comfort, support, protect, or even love the child provides no benefit
to the child.
D. Preservation of the Ethical Integrity of the Medical Profession
A fourth state interest frequently asserted as a limitation on a
patient's right to refuse life-saving medical treatment is preserving the
integrity of the medical profession. However, under prevailing medical
ethical standards, doctors generally do not advocate prolonging life at
all costs. Instead, they recognize that "the dying are more often in need
of comfort than treatment.""'  The American Medical Association in
1986 said:
Even if death is not imminent but a patient's coma is beyond
doubt irreversible and there are adequate safeguards to confirm
the accuracy of the diagnosis and with the concurrence of those
who have responsibility for the care of the patient, it is not
unethical to discontinue all means of life prolonging medical
treatment. 114
V. OPTIONS AVAILABLE TO THE STATES
Today's decision, holding only that the Constitution permits a
State to require clear and convincing evidence of Nancy Cruzan's
desire to have artificial hydration and nutrition withdrawn, does
not preclude ... States from developing other approaches for
protecting an incompetent individual's liberty interest in refusing
medical treatment .... [Tihe more challenging task of crafting
appropriate procedures for safeguarding incompetents' liberty
interests is entrusted to the "laboratory" of the States ... in
the first instance."'
save countless lives, and would cause her no greater burden than she already
bears by being fed through the gastrostomy tube? This would be too brave a
new world for me and, I submit, for our Constitution.
Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, I 10 S. Ct. 2841, 2869, n.13 (1990) (Brennan,
J., dissenting). In fact, in Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145 (Ky. 1%9), the Kentucky
Court of Appeals held that parents of an "incompetent," retarded 27-year-old with a
speech defect could exercise substituted judgment on his behalf and order removal of one
of his kidneys for transplant in his older brother.
113. Superintendent of Belchertown v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 743, 370 N.E.2d
417, 426 (1977).
114. Rasmussen by Mitchell v. Fleming, 154 Ariz. 207, 217, 741 P.2d 674, 684 (Ariz.
1987) (quoting American Medical Association, Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs,
statement, March 15, 1986).
115. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2858-59 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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In Cruzan, the Court did not hold that the requirement of clear
and convincing evidence was the only appropriate burden a state should
impose on a surrogate seeking to remove a loved one from life-sustaining
nutrition and hydration, but rather that a state could constitutionally
require it. This leaves open to the "laboratory of the states," as Justice
O'Connor said in her concurrence, the job of formulating appropriate
procedures for the removal of life-sustaining nutrition and hydration
from persons in a persistent vegetative state.
Ever since In re Quinlan,116 the seminal case in the right-to-die arena,
various state courts have wrestled with the issue, and five "tests" or
"procedures" have emerged: (Al) substituted judgment based on clear
and convincing evidence-the type required by Missouri in Cruzan, (A2)
substituted judgment where the family's best judgment as to the desires
of the patient is respected, (A3) a combination of the two, (B) a best
interests/pure objective standard, and (C) a limited objective standard.
A. Substituted Judgment
First recognized in In re Quinlan,1 7 substituted judgment in the
right-to-die arena is a subjective mechanism by which the court or
surrogate makes a decision whether to exercise an incompetent's right
to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment. The decision is based on
what the patient himself, if he were competent, would want when faced
with deciding whether to continue treatment." 8 Courts which employ
the substituted judgment approach have generally chosen one of three
paths in seeking to predict what the incompetent patient's wishes would
be. Some courts, like the Missouri Supreme Court in Cruzan, require
clear and convincing evidence of what the patient would want. Other
courts merely allow the family to make its "best judgment" as to what
the patient would choose to do, if competent. One line of cases combines
both.
1. Substituted Judgment/Clear and Convincing Evidence
One of the strictest applications of a substituted judgment test
requiring clear and convincing evidence of the patient's intent is In re
116. 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976).
117. Id.
118. Liacos, Is "Substituted Judgment" a Valid Legal Concept?, 5 Issues in L. &
Med. 215, 218 (1989) ("Under the doctrine of substituted judgment, a fact finder makes
a determination of what an incompetent person subjectively would want when faced with
the decision whether to undergo or terminate invasive medical treatment."). See also In
re Guardianship of Ingram, 102 Wash. 2d 827, 839, 689 P.2d 1363, 1369 (1984) ("The
goal is not to do what most people would do, or what the court believes is the wise
thing to do, but rather what this particular individual would do if she were competent
and understood all the circumstances.").
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Westchester County Medical Center on Behalf of Mary O'Connor."9
Mary O'Connor was an elderly woman who had suffered a number of
strokes and was physically incapacitated and mentally incompetent, al-
though not in a persistent vegetative state. Her children did not want
the hospital to artificially feed her with a nasogastric tube based on
their opinion that their mother, if she were competent, would choose
to withhold the life-sustaining treatment. °20 The evidence included: 1.
statements of a co-worker that O'Connor had said "I would never want
to be a burden on anyone and I would never want to lose my dignity
before I passed away," and that it was "monstrous" to keep people
who are "suffering very badly" alive on machinery, and 2. testimony
of O'Connor's daughters that O'Connor had frequently said, in response
to her caring for other sick people, that if she became ill and was
unable to care for herself, she would not want her life to be sustained
artificially. 121 However, none of the witnesses could say that O'Connor
had ever specifically referred to the withholding of nutrition or hy-
dration. 122
The Court of Appeals of New York, requiring clear and convincing
evidence that a patient intended to decline treatment under "particular
circumstances"'2 and looking only at a patient's "expressed intent,"'2
held that the evidence was not clear and convincing that O'Connor
would want nutrition and hydration withheld. 2
The Court of Appeals of New York did find clear and convincing
evidence in In re Eichner.'26 In that case, Brother Fox, a patient in a
persistent vegetative state, had stated his views on this "extraordinary
business" in discussions at the religious school where he worked. The
religious factor apparently held great importance for the court, which
119. 72 N.Y.2d 517, 531 N.E.2d 607, 534 N.Y.S.2d 886 (1988). For other cases requiring
clear and convincing evidence, see In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438
N.Y.S.2d 266 (1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858, 102 S. Ct. 309 (1981); In re Gardner,
534 A.2d 947 (Me. 1987); Leach v. Akron General Medical Center, 68 Ohio Misc. 1,
426 N.E.2d 809 (Ohio Ct. of Common Pleas 1980); In re Guardianship of Browning,
568 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1990).
120. O'Connor, 72 N.Y.2d at 524, 531 N.E.2d at 609, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 888.
121. Id. at 526-27, 531 N.E.2d at 611, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 890.
122. Id. at 527, 531 N.E.2d at 611, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 890.
123. Id. at 531, 531 N.E.2d at 613, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 892.
124. Id. at 530, 531 N.E.2d at 613, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 892.
125. Id. at 532, 531 N.E.2d at 614, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 893. The court held that
O'Connor's statements were only: 1. "immediate reactions to the unsettling experience of
seeing or hearing of another's unnecessarily prolonged death," 2. "no different than those
that many of us might make after witnessing an agonizing death," and 3. the "type of
statements that older people frequently, almost invariably make." Id.
126. 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266 (1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
858, 102 S. Ct. 309 (1981).
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held that the medical treatment, a respirator, could be withdrawn. 2 7
The evidence in the O'Connor and Eichner cases is very similar;
however, because of Brother Fox's "unselfish religious devotion," the
court gave greater weight to his statements. Although the New York
Court of Appeals may have found it relevant that O'Connor, unlike
Brother Fox, was not in a persistent vegetative state, the exercise of
one's right to refuse medical treatment even by a surrogate should not
be subjected to different tests depending on the medical condition of
the patient. Additionally, it is unjust and improper for a court to consider
a housewife's expressions of intent in a manner typical for a woman
who has spent her life caring for other sick people, ("I don't want to
be a burden"-type statements) to be insufficient to meet a clear and
convincing standard, while at the same time holding that the statements
by a member of a religious order must necessarily have been the result
of more profound thought and consideration and therefore meet the
evidentiary requirement.
Other states have also required clear and convincing evidence of the
patient's intent. In McConnell v. Beverly Enterprises-Connecticut,28 the
Connecticut Supreme Court found clear and convincing evidence of a
comatose woman's desire not to be kept alive through life-sustaining
nutrition and hydration. Mrs. McConnell was a registered nurse who
was very familiar with the various life-support equipment. She had told
a co-worker that if she were ever placed on life-support he should stop
it, and she told another co-worker that she "never wanted to be a
vegetable or a burden on her family.' ' 29 Additionally, Mrs. McConnell
had not wanted her own mother placed on life-support, and all family
members testified that Mrs. McConnell did not believe in the use of
life-support equipment. This test for clear and convincing evidence seems
broader than that in O'Connor, where the court's consideration was
limited to only the "expressed intent" of O'Connor because in Mc-
Connell, the court also considered McConnell's act of not placing her
mother on life-support as well as her family's opinion as to what she
would have wanted.
127. Eichner, 52 N.Y.2d at 379-80, 420 N.E.2d at 72, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 274. The court
said:
The finding that he carefully reflected on the subject, expressed his views and
concluded not to have his life prolonged by medical means if there were no
hope of recovery is supported by his religious beliefs and is not inconsistent
with his life of unselfish religious devotion. These were obviously solemn pron-
ouncements and not casual remarks made at some social gathering, nor can it
be said that he was too young to realize or feel the consequences of his
statements.
128. 209 Conn. 692, 553 A.2d 596 (1989).
129. Id. at 709, 553 A.2d at 605.
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The Missouri Supreme Court's requirement of clear and convincing
evidence in Cruzan is very similar to O'Connor and Eichner for in
Cruzan the Missouri Supreme Court only considered Nancy's statements
to her roommate and disregarded the opinions of her sister and mother
as to what Nancy would want, based on their familiarity with Nancy
in a family relationship. 30 If Missouri had instead considered alternative
types of evidence as did the McConnell court in reaching the clear and
convincing standard, such a test would not have been objectionable.
However, where a court limits itself to specific, express statements of
the patient as to particular treatments the patient would like withheld,
the clear and convincing standard becomes too rigorous a test to meet,
and the constitutional right to refuse medical treatment is frequently
foreclosed.
It is not the clear and convincing standard of proof that is itself
inappropriate. In fact, considering the seriousness of the subject matter
sought to be proven, such a standard would seem to be the proper one.
However, as illustrated by the above cases, it is a standard which is
frequently misapplied and subject to inconsistency. In the case of Brother
Fox, the court was swayed by his religious occupation. In O'Connor,
the New York Court of Appeals limited its perusal of evidence to
O'Connor's verbally expressed intent; but, in McConnell, the Connecticut
Supreme Court considered not only McConnell's statements but also her
actions. Clearly, a right that the United States Supreme Court has held
to be constitutionally protected should not be subjected to a test which
is applied so incongruously.
2. Substituted Judgment/Family's Best Judgment
A second type of substituted judgment is where the courts do not
require clear, express, specific statements by the patient but instead look
to other types of evidence and to the family's best judgment as to what
the patient, if competent, would choose to do.
The first case 3' to use this approach was Quinlan, where the New
Jersey Supreme Court was unable to discover from evidence and tes-
timony what Karen Quinlan's choice would be regarding life-sustaining
treatment. To preserve her right to privacy, however, her family could
decide for her based on what they thought Karen would have chosen.
If a putative decision by Karen to permit this non-cognitive,
vegetative existence to terminate by natural forces is regarded
130. See supra text accompanying notes 85-96.
131. See also In re L.H.R., 253 Ga. 439, 321 S.E.2d 716 (1984), and Gray by Gray
v. Romeo, 697 F. Supp. 580 (D.R.I. 1988) where the court gave great weight to the
"depth, quality, and reasoning of the family's prediction of Marcia Gray's intent." Id.
at 588.
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as a valuable incident of her right of privacy, as we believe it
to be, then it should not be discarded solely on the basis that
her condition prevents her conscious exercise of the choice. The
only practical way to prevent destruction of the right is to permit
the guardian and family of Karen to render their best judgment,
* . .as to whether she would exercise it in these circumstances. 13 2
The Supreme Court of Illinois also adopted this type of standard
in In re Estate of Longeway.3 3 Specifically rejecting O'Connor's re-
quirement of "actual, specific express intent,"1 14 the court instead held
a guardian could substitute her judgment for Longeway based upon
"other" evidence of Longeway's intent. The court articulated guidelines
for this "other" evidence based on the "patient's personal value sys-
tem." 1
35
[Elven if no prior specific statements were made, in the context
of the individual's entire prior mental life, including his or her
philosophical, religious and moral views, life goals, values about
the purpose of life and the way it should be lived, and attitudes
toward sickness, medical procedures, suffering and death, that
individual's likely treatment/nontreatment preferences can be dis-
covered. Family members are most familiar with this entire life
context .... [T]he family's knowledge exists nevertheless, in-
tuitively felt by them and available as an important decision-
making tool. 136
Figuring most prominently under this standard is the recognition of
the family as being in the best position to know what the patient would
choose if he were competent to do so. Commentators,'3 medical au-
132. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 41, 355 A.2d 647, 664 (1976) (emphasis added).
133. 133 I11. 2d 33, 549 N.E.2d 292 (1989).
134. Id. at 50, 549 N.E.2d at 300.
135. Id. at 49, 549 N.E.2d at 299.
136. Id. at 49-50, 549 N.E.2d at 299-300 (quoting Newman, Treatment Refusals for
the Critically Ill: Proposed Rules for the Family, the Physician and the State, 3 N.Y.L.
Sch. Hum. Rts. Ann. 45-46 (1985), as quoted in In re Jobes, 108 N.J. 394, 415, 529
A.2d 434, 445 (1987)).
137. See, e.g., Rhoden, supra note 22, at 437-38 ("1 submit that the family is indeed
the best decisionmaker, and that a preference for family choice can be gleaned from
history, from society's respect for the family, and from the fact that family decisionmaking
best embodies patient preferences.... Not only are family members most likely to be
privy to any relevant statements that patients have made on the topics of treatment or
its termination, but they also have longstanding knowledge of the patient's character
traits .... Longstanding knowledge, love, and intimacy make family members the best
candidates for implementing the patient's probable wishes and upholding her values. Family
members also care most .. ") and Newman, Treatment Refusals for the Critically Ill:
Proposed Rules for the Family, the Physician and the State, 3 N.Y.L. Sch. Hum. Rts.
Ann. 35, 45-46 (1985), as quoted in Jobes, 108 N.J. at 415-16, 529 A.2d at 445.
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thorities, 3 s and the public'39 support the family as decision-maker when
a person is unable to exercise his right to refuse life-sustaining medical
treatment. '40
Family members are best qualified to make substituted judgments
for incompetent patients not only because of their peculiar grasp
of the patient's approach to life, but also because of their special
bonds with him or her. Our common human experience informs
us that family members are generally most concerned with the
welfare of the patient. It is they who provide for the patient's
comfort, care, and best interests, . . . and they who treat the
patient as a person, rather than a symbol of a cause. 41
Of course, the main objection to such a standard is that such a test
lends itself to easy manipulation by families with less than noble interests
in the life or death of a relative. However, with the assistance of doctors
and nurses involved in the case who have observed family interaction
with the patient, and with the guidance of an appointed guardian ad
138. Jobes, 108 N.J. at 417, 529 A.2d at 446 (quoting President's Commission for
the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research,
Deciding to Forego Life-Sustaining Treatment: A Report on the Ethical, Medical and
Legal Issues in Treatment Decisions 4-5 (1983) ("The decisions of patients' families should
determine what sort of medical care permanently unconscious patients [who have not left
clear directives] receive.")) (quoting New Jersey Chapter of the American College of
Physicians Executive Council Policy Statement on Care of Irreversibly Ill Patients (Oct.
1986) ("Family members are presumed to be the appropriate surrogate decisionmakers
for patients diagnosed as being incapable of giving informed consent.")) (quoting Statement
of the Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs of the American Medical Association on
Withholding or Withdrawing Life Prolonging Medical Treatment (Mar. 15, 1986) ("[Tihe
choice of the patient, or his family or legal representative if the patient is incompetent
to act on his own behalf, should prevail.")).
139. Jobes, 108 N.J. at 418-19 n.1l, 529 A.2d at 446 n.ll. See Newark Star Ledger,
Aug. 10, 1986, at 18, col. 4, (84% of 800 persons polled felt a family member should
be allowed to discontinue treatment for a comatose relative if the patient had said he or
she did not want to be kept alive by life-sustaining treatment. Sixty-four percent said the
family should be allowed to discontinue treatment even when the patient had said nothing,
but the family believed he or she would not want to be sustained in this condition.) and
N.Y. Times, Dec. 2, 1986, at CIO, col. 2-6 (70% of the 2000 people questioned "strongly
agreed" that family members should decide whether to use life-sustaining medical treatment
for one incapable of deciding) as quoted in Jobes, 108 N.J. at 418-19 n.11, 529 A.2d
at 446 n.l1.
140. But see Massachusetts' line of cases starting with Superintendent of Belchertown
v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977) where the substituted judgment is
exercised by the court and not the family ("In short, the decision in cases such as this
should be that which would be made by the incompetent person, if that person were
competent, but taking into account the present and future incompetency of the individual
as one of the factors which would necessarily enter into the decision-making process of
the competent person."). Id. at 752-53, 370 N.E.2d at 431.
141. In re Jobes, 108 N.J. 394, 416, 529 A.2d 434, 445 (1987).
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litem, the court, should be able to discern whether the family truly has
an interest in the patient's well-being.
3. Substituted Judgment/Combination of the Above
The New Jersey Supreme Court in In re Peter by Johanning42 and
In re Jobes43 fashioned a test which combines the above two variations
of the substituted judgment test-clear and convincing evidence and
family's best judgment.
The New Jersey Supreme Court held that where clear and convincing
evidence is present of what the patient, if competent, would choose, a
subjective test is applied,'" but where clear and convincing proof is
absent, the patient's right to refuse treatment through a surrogate is
not foreclosed. If clear and convincing evidence is absent, the principles
of Quinlan'4 are applied. 4 Under Quinlan, the life-sustaining treatment
may be terminated if the guardian or family of the patient in a persistent
vegetative state concludes that the patient would not want to be sustained
on life-support, if attending physicians conclude there is no reasonable
possibility of the patient ever emerging from the persistent vegetative
state and that the life-support should be terminated, and if the hospital
"Ethics Committee" agrees.' 47
The Peter/Jobes approach is clearly one of the better tests that state
courts may apply. This approach preserves the aspect of self-determi-
nation, one of the bases for a right to refuse life-sustaining medical
treatment, by first looking to see if there is clear and convincing evidence
of an incompetent's wishes. If this evidence is lacking, the court does
not "punish" a person in a persistent vegetative state for failing to
have made statements or expressions about his desires regarding the
withholding of life-sustaining treatment. Instead, the court then defers
to the family's substituted judgment, based on knowledge gained about
the patient in the family relationship, to decide for itself what the patient
would have chosen, and if the attending physician and hospital "Ethics
Committee" agree that the patient has no chance of ever recovering to
a cognitive state, the treatment can be suspended.
The Peter/Jobes approach combines the best aspects of the clear
and convincing evidence requirement and the family's best judgment
142. 108 N.J. 365, 529 A.2d 419 (1987).
143. 108 N.J. 394, 529 A.2d 434 (1987).
144. Peter, 108 N.J. at 377-78, 529 A.2d at 425; Jobes, 108 N.J. at 411-13, 529 A.2d
at 443. See supra text accompanying notes 119-130 regarding the clear and convincing
standard.
145. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976).
146. Peter, 108 N.J. at 377, 529 A.2d at 425; Jobes, 108 N.J. at 420, 529 A.2d at
447.
147. Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 55, 355 A.2d at 671.
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standard. As such, the courts which adopt this standard preserve the
patient's right of self-determination and at the same time recognize the
family as occupying a unique role in deciding what the patient would
have wanted.
B. Best Interests/Pure Objective
A second test courts use to implement an incompetent patient's right
to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment involves an objective assess-
ment of what treatment would be in the patient's best interests. This
test is different from a substituted judgment type test because rather
than trying to decide what medical decision the patient would have
made, the surrogate attempts to make a decision that will be in the
"best interests" of the patient. Considerations include a patient's relief
from suffering, his prognosis and possibility of recovery, and the quality
and extent of his life on the life-sustaining treatment.148 "An accurate
assessment will encompass consideration of the satisfaction of present
desires, the opportunities for future satisfactions, and the possibility of
developing or regaining the capacity for self-determination."' ' 49
Under this test, no evidence of the patient's wishes prior to incom-
petency is required, but such evidence, if it exists would be probative
on deciding what action would be in the patient's best interests.1so
The best interests test has been criticized because it involves a
determination by a third person as to the quality of life that a persistent
vegetative patient may experience, "thereby undermining the foundation
of self-determination and inviolability of the person upon which the
148. Rasmussen by Mitchell v. Fleming, 154 Ariz. 207, 222, 741 P.2d 674, 689 (Ariz.
1987). See also, In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985) where in absence of
any evidence at all, life-sustaining treatment may still be withheld if the "net burdens of
the patient's life with the treatment should clearly and markedly outweigh the benefits
that the patient derives from life." Id. at 366, 486 A.2d at 1232. The major factor in
the Conroy "pure objective" test is the presence of severe pain such that the administration
of life-sustaining treatment would be inhumane. Because persistent vegetative patients do
not experience any pain, the New Jersey Supreme Court, in In re Peter by Johanning,
108 N.J. 365, 529 A.2d 419 (1987) clarified Conroy as applying only to marginally cognitive,
elderly patients, and instead applied a substituted judgment test where no express evidence
of the patient's intent was necessary.
149. Rasmussen, 154 Ariz. at 222, 741 P.2d at 689, quoting President's Commission
for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine & Biomedical & Behavioral Research,
Deciding to Forego Life-Sustaining Treatment: A Report on the Ethical and Medical and
Legal Issues in Treatment Decisions 1, 135 (1983).
150. See, Conservatorship of Drabick, 200 Cal. App. 3d 185, 210-11, 245 Cal. Rptr.
840, 856 (1988), cert denied, 488 U.S. 958, 109 S. Ct. 399 (1988), reh'g denied, 488 U.S.
1024, 109 S. Ct. 828 (1989); In re Conservatorship of Torres, 357 N.W.2d 332, 339
(Minn. 1984) ("At a minimum, any determination of a conservatee's 'best interests' must
involve some consideration of the conservatee's wishes.").
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right to refuse medical treatment stands."'' However, a logical extension
of this criticism would lead to the conclusion that no incompetent person
would ever be able to exercise his right to refuse medical treatment
through a surrogate, because the incompetent person in such a situation
is not making a decision based on self-determination. Courts, regardless
of the test they impose, have never so held, and although the reasoning
that a patient's right to refuse medical treatment survives incompetence
"is a legal fiction at best,' 11 2 state courts and now the United States
Supreme Court in Cruzan recognize a right to refuse medical treatment
even after incompetency.
On the other hand, the best interests test is not one of the better
tests when compared to the combined Peter/Jobes approach, the family's
best judgment standard, or even the clear and convincing evidence
requirement, all of which strive to achieve what the patient would have
wanted, either through express evidence or evidence implied in the family
relationship. By failing to truly consider the patient's desires, the best
interests test is an anomaly, for the essence of a surrogate's exercise of
an incompetent's right to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment lies in
achieving what the patient would have chosen if competent. The surrogate
is merely exercising the right for the patient because of his incompetency.
Additionally, the test involves an assessment by a third person of the
benefits and burdens of an incompetent's life, an idea that may put
society on the edge of a slippery slope into legalized euthanasia. Taken
to the extreme, the best interests test could be applied to the handicapped,
the brain damaged, the elderly, or any other group of persons whose
lives do not appear to meet the benefits/burdens analysis.
For the above reasons, the best interests standard is not one which
should be applied in the right to die arena.
C. Limited Objective
In addition to the three variations of the substituted judgment test
and the best interests test, a third standard is available to the states-
which could be called the "limited objective test." In In re Conroy,'5
the Supreme Court of New Jersey adopted three tests which apply when
151. In re Estate of Longeway, 133 11. 2d 33, 49, 549 N.E.2d 292, 299 (1989). See
also, In re Moe, 385 Mass. 555, 432 N.E.2d 712 (1982).
To speak solely in terms of the "best interests" of the ward, or of the State's
interest, is to obscure the fundamental issue: Is the State to impose a solution
on an incompetent based on external criteria, or is it to seek to protect and
implement the individual's personal rights and integrity? We reject the former
possibility.
Id. at 566, 432 N.E.2d at 720.
152. Drabick, 200 Cal. App. 3d at 208, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 854.
153. 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985).
1336 [Vol. 51
NOTES
a surrogate is seeking to exercise an incompetent's right to refuse treat-
ment. In addition to a substituted judgment standard that required clear
and convincing evidence of the patient's desires and a pure objective/
best interests test,'54 the court also enunciated a limited objective test.
Where the evidence is too "vague, casual, or remote"' to constitute
clear and convincing evidence but is nevertheless "trustworthy,"' 56 and
where it is clear that the burdens of life continued by treatment outweigh
the benefits of life, life-sustaining treatment could be withdrawn.
The Supreme Court of Washington adopted a very similar type of
test in In re Guardianship of Grant.' The court held that a surrogate
could exercise substituted judgment for an incompetent patient if he
met one of two prongs. If the surrogate determines that the patient, if
competent, would choose to refuse life-sustaining treatment,5 8 the treat-
ment could be terminated. An evidentiary standard was not given here.
If such a determination could not be made, the surrogate would then
look to the best interests of the patient.5 9
Like the Peter/Jobes standard, the limited objective test first looks
to see if there is clear and convincing evidence, or at least "trustworthy"
evidence, of the patient's desires. However, the second prong is not the
"family's best judgment" standard but instead a best interests analysis
which, as explained previously, is one which least effectuates the policies
behind allowing a surrogate to exercise a patient's right to die.
VI. THE ROLE OF Lxno WILs
The day will come when people will be able to carry a card,
notarized and legally executed, which explains that they do not
154. See supra text accompanying notes 148-152.
155. 98 N.J. at 366, 486 A.2d at 1232.
156. Id., 486 A.2d at 1232.
157. 109 Wash. 2d 545, 747 P.2d 445 (1987).
158. Id. at 566, 747 P.2d at 456. In determining whether the patient would choose
to terminate life-sustaining treatment, factors include, the "patient's character and per-
sonality, general attitude towards medical treatment, and prior statements." Id. at 567,
747 P.2d at 457.
159. Id. at 567, 747 P.2d at 456. In determining what would be in the best interest
of the patient, factors are:
[E]vidence about the patient's present level of physical, sensory, emotional, and
cognitive functioning; the degree of physical pain resulting from the medical
condition, treatment, and termination of treatment, respectively; the degree of
humiliation, dependence, and loss of dignity probably resulting from the con-
dition and treatment; the life expectancy and prognosis for recovery with and
without treatment; the various treatment options; and the risks, side effects,
and benefits of each of those options.
Id. at 568, 747 P.2d at 457, quoting Conroy, 98 N.J. at 397, 486 A.2d at 1231 (Handier,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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want to be kept alive beyond the humanum point, and au-
thorizing the ending of their biological processes by any of the
methods of euthanasia which seems appropriate 60
A living will is a written directive through which a person can
provide in advance for the withdrawal of life-sustaining procedures,
should they ever become necessary. It is not a prerequisite for an
incompetent patient to be able to exercise through a surrogate his right
to the withdrawal of life-sustaining medical procedures-for, as seen in
earlier discussion, states have formulated various tests to be applied in
situations where there is no living will. However, the presence of a
living will which meets all of the statutory requirements will generally
preclude any discussion of the patient's best interests or intent, and thus
its instructions will be respected.
At least forty-two states' 6' have enacted living will legislation. Al-
though each state statute is different, common provisions include sections
on: legislative findings, 62 definitions, 63 the form of declaration,' 4 pro-
160. Koop, Decisions at the End of Life, 5 Issues in L. & Med. 225 (1989) (quoting
Joseph Fletcher, a prominent Episcopalian theologian who favors active euthanasia).
161. Ala. Code §§ 22-8A-1 to -10 (1990); Alaska Stat. §§ 18.12.010-.100 (1986); Ariz.
Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 36-3201 to -3210 (1986); Ark. Stat. Ann. §§ 20-17-201 to -218 (Supp.
1989); Cal. Health & Safety Code §§ 7185-7195 (West Supp. 1991); Colo. Rev. Stat. §§
15-18-101 to 113 (1989 & Supp. 1990); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 19a-570 to -575 (West
Supp. 1991); Del. Code Ann. tit. 16, §§ 2501-2509 (1983); D.C. Code Ann. §§ 6-2421
to -2430 (1989); Fla. Stat. §§ 765.01-.15 (1986); Ga. Code Ann. §§ 31-32-1 to -12 (1985
& Supp. 1990); Haw. Rev. Stat. §§ 327D-1 to -27 (Supp. 1990); Idaho Code §§ 39-4501
to -4509 (1985 & Supp. 1990); Living Will Act, Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 110 1/2, para. 701-
710 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1991); Ind. Code Ann. §§ 16-8-11-1 to -22 (West Supp. 1990);
Iowa Code Ann. §§ 144A.1 - .11 (West 1989); Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 65-28,101 to -28,109
(1985); La. R.S. 40:1299.58.1 - .10 (Supp. 1991); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 22, §§ 2921-
2931 (West Supp. 1990); Md. Health-Gen. Code Ann. §§ 5-601 to -614 (1990); Minn.
Stat. Ann. §§ 145B.01-.17 (West Supp. 1991); Miss. Code Ann. §§ 41-41-101 to -121
(Supp. 1990); Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 459.010-.055 (Supp. 1991); Mont. Code Ann. §§ 50-9-
101 to -104, -110 to -111, -201 to -206 (1989); Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 449.540-690 (1989);
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 137-H:1 to -H:16 (Supp. 1989); N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 24-7-1 to
-11 (1986); N.Y. Pub. Health Law §§ 2960-2978 (McKinney Supp. 1991); N.C. Gen. Stat.
§§ 90-320 to -323 (1990); N.D. Cent. Code §§ 23-06.4-01 to -14 (Supp. 1989); Okla. Stat.
tit. 63, §§ 3101-3111 (Supp. 1991); Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 127.605 to .650 (1990); S.C. Code
Ann. §§ 44-77-10 to -160 (Law. Co-op Supp. 1990); Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 32-11-101 to
-110 (Supp. 1990); Tex. Health and Safety Code §§ 672.001-.021 (Vernon 1991); Utah
Code Ann. §§ 75-2-1101 to -1118 (Supp. 1991); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, §§ 5251-5262
(1987); Va. Code Ann. §§ 54.1-2981 to -2992 (1991); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §§ 70.122.010-
.905 (Supp. 1991); W. Va. Code §§ 16-30-1 to -13 (1991 & Supp. 1991); Wis. Stat. §§
154.01-.15 (1989); Wyo. Stat. §§ 35-22-101 to -109 (1988 & Supp. 1991).
162. California's legislative findings and declaration:
The Legislature finds that adult persons have the fundamental right to control
the decisions relating to the rendering of their own medical care, including the
decision to have life-sustaining procedures withheld or withdrawn in instances
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cedures for revocation, 165 procedures for doctor non-compliance, state-
of a terminal condition.
The Legislature further finds that modern medical technology has made pos-
sible the artificial prolongation of human life beyond natural limits.
The Legislature further finds that, in the interest of protecting individual
autonomy, such prolongation of life for persons with a terminal condition may
cause loss of patient dignity and unnecessary pain and suffering, while providing
nothing medically necessary or beneficial to the patient.
The Legislature further finds that there exists considerable uncertainty in the
medical and legal professions as to the legality of terminating the use or
application of life-sustaining procedures where the patient has voluntarily and
in sound mind evidenced a desire that such procedures be withheld or withdrawn.
In recognition of the dignity and privacy which patients have a right to expect,
the Legislature hereby declares that the laws of the State of California shall
recognize the right of an adult person to make a written directive instructing
his physician to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining procedures in the event of
a terminal condition.
Cal. Health & Safety Code § 7186 (West Supp. 1991).
163. California's section on definitions:
(a) "Attending physician" means the physician selected by, or assigned to,
the patient who has primary responsibility for the treatment and care of the
patient.
(b) "Directive" means a written document voluntarily executed by the declarant
in accordance with the requirements of Section 7188. The directive, or a copy
of the directive, shall be made part of the patient's medical records.
(c) "Life-sustaining procedure" means any medical procedure or intervention
which utilizes mechanical or other artificial means to sustain, restore, or supplant
a vital function, which, when applied to a qualified patient, would serve only
to artificially prolong the moment of death and where, in the judgment of the
attending physician, death is imminent whether or not such procedures are
utilized. "Life-sustaining procedure" shall not include the administration of
medication or the performance of any medical procedure deemed necessary to
alleviate pain.
(d) "Physician" means a physician and surgeon licensed by the Medical Board
of California or the Board of Osteopathic Examiners.
(e) "Qualified patient" means a patient diagnosed and certified in writing to
be afflicted with a terminal condition by two physicians, one of whom shall
be the attending physician, who have personally examined the patient.
(f) "Terminal condition" means an incurable condition caused by injury,
disease, or illness, which, regardless of the application of life-sustaining pro-
cedures, would, within reasonable medical judgment, produce death, and where
the application of life-sustaining procedures serve only to postpone the moment
of death of the patient.
Cal. Health & Safety Code § 7187 (West Supp. 1991).
164. Missouri's Declaration:
DECLARATION
I have the primary right to make my own decisions concerning treatment that
might unduly prolong the dying process. By this declaration I express to my
physician, family and friends my intent. If I should have a terminal condition
it is my desire that my dying not be prolonged by administration of death-
1991] 1339
0LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
ments that a living will does not affect insurance, and statements that
the state does not approve of euthanasia.'"
The major problem with the living will is that although millions of
people have already executed one, 67 this represents only a small fraction
of the population, and even then, there is no guarantee that the patients
who fall into a persistent vegetative state will be those who executed
living wills.'" The small number of living wills executed may be due to
prolonging procedures. If my condition is terminal and I am unable to participate
in decisions regarding my medical treatment, I direct my attending physician to
withhold or withdraw medical procedures that merely prolong the dying process
and are not necessary to my comfort or to alleviate pain. It is not my intent
to authorize affirmative or deliberate acts or omissions to shorten my life rather
only to permit the natural process of dying.
Signed this .. ___day of
Signature
City, County and State of residence
The declarant is known to me, is eighteen years of age or older, of sound mind
and voluntarily signed this document in my presence.
Witness
Address
Witness
Address
REVOCATION PROVISION
I hereby revoke the above declaration,
Signed
(signature of declarant)
Date
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 459.015 (Supp. 1991).
165. Missouri's procedures for revocation:
1. A declaration may be revoked at any time and in any manner by which the
declarant is able to communicate his intent to revoke, without regard to mental
or physical condition.
2. The attending physician or health care provider shall make the revocation a
part of the declarant's medical record.
3. There shall be no criminal or civil liability on the part of any person for
failure to act upon a revocation made pursuant to this section unless the
revocation is in the patient's medical record or unless that person has actual
knowledge of the revocation.
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 459.020 (Supp. 1991).
166. (5) Sections 459.010 to 459.055 do not condone, authorize or approve mercy
killing or euthanasia nor permit any affirmative or deliberate act or omission
to shorten or end life.
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 459.055(5) (Supp. 1991).
167. Blodgett, New "Living Wills," 72 A.B.A. J. 24 (Sept. 1, 1986) (quoting George
•Annas, of the Boston University School of Medicine).
168. Brennan wrote in his dissent:
Surveys show that the overwhelming majority of Americans have not ex-
ecuted such written instructions. See Emmanuel & Emmanuel, The Medical
Directive: A New Comprehensive Advance Care Document, 261 JAMA 3288
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a lack of awareness of the statutes, procrastination, 169 a lack of a feeling
of "urgency," or even the refusal to dwell on one's own mortality.
70
Another problem with living wills which may limit their application
even where one has been executed is in meeting the statutory require-
ments. For example, at least twenty-one states specifically exclude nu-
trition and hydration from the types of medical treatment which can
be withdrawn pursuant to a directive.' 7 ' Thus, even where a living will
has been executed in those states, nutrition and hydration cannot be
withdrawn unless the patient meets the so-called "test" the state has
adopted to be applied in the absence of a living will. 7 2 Additionally,
of the forty-two states which have living will legislation, thirty-eight
specifically require that the patient be in a "terminal condition."' 7 3
(1989) (only 901o of Americans execute advance directives about how they would
wish treatment decisions to be handled if they became incompetent); American
Medical Association Surveys of Physician and Public Opinion on Health Care
Issues 29-30 (1988) (only 15% of those surveyed had executed living wills); 2
President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and
Biomedical and Behavioral Research, Making Health Care Decisions 241-242
(1982) (230%o of those surveyed said that they had put treatment instructions in
writing).
Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2875 n.21 (1990) (Brennan,
J., dissenting.).
169. Id. at 2875 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Barber v. Superior Court, 147 Cal.
App. 3d 1006, 1015, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 489 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 1983)).
The lack of generalized public awareness of the statutory scheme and the typically
human characteristics of procrastination and reluctance to contemplate the need
for such arrangements however makes this a tool which will all too often go
unused by those who might desire it.
170. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting):
The probability of becoming irreversibly vegetative is so low that many people
may not feel an urgency to marshal formal evidence of their preferences. Some
may not wish to dwell on their own physical deterioration and mortality.
171. Alabama, Arizona, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa,
Maine, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South
Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, Wisconsin, and Wyoming specifically exclude nutrition and
hydration from life support able to be withdrawn under a living will. Colorado, Maryland,
and Minnesota have rules such that unless it is specifically included in the living will,
nutrition and hydration are unable to be withdrawn under a general living will referring
only to life-sustaining treatment.
172. See supra note 161 for statutory references.
173. Statutes vary in their definition of "terminal." For instance, California defines
a terminal condition as: "an incurable condition caused by injury, disease, or illness,
which, regardless of the application of life-sustaining procedures, would, within reasonable
medical judgment, produce death, and where the application of life-sustaining procedures
serve only to postpone the moment of death of the patient." Cal. Health & Safety Code
§ 7187(f) (West Supp. 1991). Nancy Cruzan would not have been terminal under this
definition where, interpreting "regardless" to mean "with or without," with the treatment
Nancy could live 30 years. See supra note 32 and supporting text. Missouri, Nancy's
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Because patients in a persistent vegetative state can live in that condition
for the length of a normal life-span, 7 4 arguably they are not "terminal"
and any living will executed would be inapplicable.'
At least twelve states, 76 including Louisiana, provide for decision-
making procedures in the absence of a living will, such that certain
enumerated persons can make the declaration for the incompetent pa-
tient.'" However, the majority of those twelve states still preclude nu-
trition and hydration from being withheld in the declaration and also
require the patient to be in a terminal condition. Thus, even if Missouri
had such a provision, Nancy Cruzan's parents would have been pro-
hibited from exercising a declaration for her.
Louisiana's living will statute, Louisiana Revised Statutes 40:1299.58.1-
.10, does not explicitly preclude nutrition and hydration from being
withheld pursuant to a living will; however, it does state that any
treatment which is "necessary to provide comfort care" cannot be
home state, defines a terminal condition as: "an incurable or irreversible condition which,
in the opinion of the attending physician, is such that death will occur within a short
time regardless of the application of medical procedures." Mo. Rev. Stat. § 459.010(6)
(Supp. 1991). For the same reasons as stated above, if Nancy had had a living will, it
would have been inapplicable because she would not have met the definition of terminal.
174. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 411 (Mo. 1988). Doctors predicted Nancy
could have lived another 30 years with the aid of life-sustaining treatment.
175. At this writing, four states require less than a terminal condition. Arkansas requires
that a patient be at least "permanently unconscious," Ark. Stat. Ann. § 20-17-201(7)
(Supp. 1989); Idaho requires at least a "persistent vegetative state," Idaho Code § 39-
4503(3) (1985 & Supp. 1990); New Mexico allows "irreversible coma" although it is
defined much like a persistent vegetative state, N.M. Stat. Ann. § 24-7-2-B (1986); and
Louisiana defines a qualified patient as one having a terminal and irreversable condition
or one in a "continual profound comatose state," La. R.S. 40:1299.58.2(7) (Supp. 1991).
176. Arkansas, Connecticut, Florida, Iowa, Louisiana, New Mexico, New York (al-
though it is limited to a "do not resuscitate order"), North Carolina, Oregon, Texas,
Utah, and Virginia all provide for this authority. See supra note 161 for statutory
references.
177. See, e.g., Louisiana's provision:
(2) When a comatose or incompetent person or a person who is physically or
mentally incapable of communication has been certified as a qualified patient
and has not previously made a declaration, any of the following individuals in
the following order of priority, if there is no individual in a prior class who
is reasonably available, willing, and competent to act, may make a declaration
on the qualified patient's behalf:
(a) The judicially appointed tutor or curator of the patient if one has
been appointed....
(b) The patient's spouse not judicially separated.
(c) An adult child of the patient.
(d) The parents of the patient.
(e) The patient's sibling.
(f) The patient's other ascendants or descendants.
La. R.S. 40:1299.58.5(2) (Supp. 1991).
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withheld. Because it is arguable that "comfort care" may be interpreted
by a court to include the administration of food and water, a Louisiana
citizen may find his right to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment
foreclosed even though he signed a living will. Based on the Cruzan
Court's and numerous lower courts' recognition of nutrition and hy-
dration as medical treatment which a person has the right to refuse,
the Louisiana Legislature should clear up the ambiguity in this statute.
A possible solution would be the creation of a presumption that a living
will's declaration includes the withholding of nutrition and hydration
unless otherwise specified.
VII. SUMMARY
Medicine has advanced to such a degree that it "has effectively
created a twilight zone of suspended animation where death commences
while life, in some form, continues.' ' 7 s Patients in a persistent vegetative
state exist in this twilight zone, irreversibly unaware and unconscious,
and robbed of all dignity. As a result, most states have fashioned tests
or mechanisms by which a surrogate can exercise such a patient's right
to refuse lifesaving medical treatment.
In its first ever right-to-die case, one involving a persistently veg-
etative patient, the United States Supreme Court recognized a common
law right and a federal constitutional right to refuse life-sustaining
medical treatment, including nutrition and hydration. Instead of ex-
tending the right of privacy to this area, the Court classified the con-
stitutional right as a liberty interest. Thus, the right does not benefit
from the heightened judicial protection given privacy rights and instead
can be infringed on by states subject to procedural due process require-
ments, the extent of which is decided by the relevant state interests.
Additionally, the Court held that where a patient was incompetent, a
state could require clear and convincing evidence in the form of specific,
express statements before a surrogate could exercise the patient's right
to refuse treatment.
Because the Court did not say that the clear and convincing evi-
dentiary requirement was the appropriate one but merely one that could
constitutionally be applied, states are free to apply other tests until they
are deemed unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. In addition to the
substituted judgment test requiring clear and convincing evidence, states
may also apply a substituted judgment test which defers to the best
judgment of the family as to what the patient would have wanted or
a substituted judgment standard combining both the clear and convincing
178. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2863 (1990)
(Brennan, J., dissenting, quoting Rasmussen v. Fleming, 154 Ariz. 207, 211, 741 P.2d
674, 678 (1987)).
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and best judgment aspects. Two other tests available include a best
interests pure objective approach which balances the benefits and burdens
of a patient's life and a limited objective approach which first looks
to some "trustworthy" evidence of the patient's intent and then balances
the benefits and burdens of continued life.
A living will is a statutory mechanism that is available in many
states; however, its use is not yet widespread, and a living will may
not always meet the statutory requirements.
VIII. CONCLUSION
I suspect hundreds of thousands of people can rest free, knowing
that when death beckons they can meet it face to face with
dignity, free from the fear of unwanted and useless medical
treatment. 
79
The last seven years of Nancy's life were not in vain. Although she
was not aware of the legal storm swirling around her, many others
were, and as a result, families have started to discuss, with particularity,
their desires on the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining treat-
ment. Additionally, the demand for living wills has grown.'8 0
Certainly, these family discussions will make it easier for a surrogate
to meet a clear and convincing evidentiary standard imposed by a state;
however, our concern should not lie with the families who can meet
the burden of proof but with those who cannot. In formulating policies
and requirements for a surrogate to exercise an incompetent patient's
right to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment, the judiciary and the
state legislatures would be wise to remember that many people, because
of their youth or perhaps their fear, simply do not foresee an illness
or injury that will leave them in a persistent vegetative state. These are
the people who do not leave clear and convincing evidence of their
wishes; however, this should not doom them to a death "without dignity."
If such a case reaches the Louisiana judicial system, the courts
would do well to adopt the well-reasoned approach utilized in In re
Peter and In re Jobes.18s By first looking to see if there is clear and
convincing evidence of the patient's intent and only afterwards to the
family's best judgment as to what an incompetent would have chosen
if competent, this approach respects the self-determination aspect of such
a decision and yet does not foreclose the right to die with dignity if
179. Written statement by Nancy's father after her death, as quoted in Smolowe,
Bringing an End to Limbo, Time Mag., p. 64, vol. 136, no. 27, Dec. 24, 1990.
180. Smolowe, Bringing an End to Limbo, Time Mag., p. 64, vol. 136, no. 27, Dec.
24, 1990.
181. See supra text accompanying notes 142-147 on the Peter/Jobes standard.
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such evidence is lacking. Instead, the New Jersey Supreme Court then
looks to the family's best judgment as to what the patient would have
wanted based on unique knowledge gleaned from their relationship with
the patient in a family setting.
Once society understands that patients in a persistent vegetative state
or an irreversible coma are permanently unconscious and essentially
"dead," society will realize the horror of keeping these patients alive
for years on machinery.
Anne Marie Gaudin*
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